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WHAT PUBLICATIONS OF COMMERCIAL AGENCIES
ARE PRIVILEGED.
IT is now about fifty years since the idea first originated of mak-
ing a business of collecting information relating to the financial
responsibility of members of the business community, and selling
it to persons interested in it. Since then this idea has developed
into the modern commercial agency, an instrumentality of com-
merce indispensable, as business is now carried on, and second in
importance only to the modern means of rapid transit and commu-
nication. The commercial agency seems to be an inevitable out-
growth of modern conditions of trade. The development of rail-
road and water transportation greatly extended the area in which
business could be carried on from the great centres of trade, and
consequently greatly extended the area in which sellers living in
those centres of trade had to give credits. The difficulties of the
credit system, great when buyer and seller live in the same or
neighboring communities, became vastly increased when, by the in-
crease in the area of trade, buyer and seller might reside in widely
separated communities. It was to meet these increased difficulties
that the commercial agency came into existence.
Of the methods of the modern commercial agency little need be
said. The large agencies have offices in all the larger trade cen-
tres, where the information collected by their correspondents or
agents is sent. The chief business of the agencies is to furnish
to its subscribers at one of its offices, and upon written application,
VOL. XXXV.-86 (681)
WHAT PUBLICATIONS OF
written reports, giving the information which the company has on
its record concerning the parties inquired after. As adjuncts to
this its main business, most agencies publish, from time to time,
for the exclusive benefit of subscribers, books, giving the name and
address, and the financial standing and credit of all business men
and houses in the district covered by the book, and also a paper or
sheet, issued at regular intervals, and for the exclusive use of
subscribers, on which are printed matters appearing of record which
affect the credit of business men, such as judgments, assignments,
mortgages, conveyances, &c., also, in some cases, matters of public
notoriety, such as that a business house has been burned out, or a
business man has died. The book above described is usually known
as the reference book, the paper as the sheet, or notification sheet,
and these names will be used in this article to designate them. The
object of the reference 'book is to give subscribers the most general
information as to the standing of all business men and houses in
the business community. The notification sheet is to keep subscribers
posted as to all sudden developments affecting the credit of business
men or houses.
The development of the commercial agency gave rise to new and
important questions of law. One of the most important of these
questions was, whether the various publications, by means of which
the agencies convey information to subscribers, were privileged
publications. The first case in which this question was involved,
was Taylor v. Church, 1 E. D. Smith (N. Y.) 279, decided in 1851.
The facts of that case were as follows. The defendants, who had
a commercial agency in New York city, printed on sheets and after-
ward in a book, a report of a business house in Columbus, Miss.,
of which the plaintiff was a member, which, after giving a rather
unfavorable account of the business capacity of the plaintiff and
the other members of the firm, said of the plaintiff, Taylor, that he
was said to be an unprincipled character. The sheets and books
were distributed among subscribers, some of whom were interested
in the report, but most of whom were not. In an action of libel
by Taylor, the defendants set up that the book and sheet were
privileged publicati ns. The court refused so to hold, on the
ground that they were furnished to persons having no present
interest in the report, and by persons having no other interest in
furnishing it than to gain a profit thereby. The court say: "No
case that has been cited protects a communication made for the
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mere purpose of profit, and to persons having at the time no inter-
est in knowing. Nor can such a rule be maintained upon principle.
The only ground of privileged communications is interest, either in
the party giving or receiving the information; but it is not to be
found in a case where no. such interest exists at the time the com-
munication was made. Any extension of the rule would be fraught
with danger to that class of business men to whom credit is of any
value."
The court express an opinion that, if the information had been
communicated only to persons interested, the communication would
have been privileged. They say, however, that the communication
must be made directly by the proprietor of the agency, without the
intervention of clerks or printers, in order to be privileged. The
ruling of the court that the publications in question were not
privileged, was sustained on appeal: Taylor v. Church, 8 N. Y.
452.
The point made in Taylor v. Church, that the communication
must be direct from the proprietor of the agency, in order to be
privileged, was decided in the case of Beardsley v. Tappan, 5
Blatch. (U. S. C. Ct.) 497. In that case it was held that informa-
tion communicated by clerks of the agency to the clerks of the
subscribers, was not privileged. Judge NELSON, wiio decided the
case, held that although a communication of the information direct
to subscribers might have been privileged, communications made
through clerks who had no interest in the information communi-
cated, were not privileged. He says: "I am strongly inclined to
think, that, if the establishments are to be upheld at all, the limita-
tion attached to them by the court below is not unreasonable, to
wit, that it must be an individual transaction, and not an establish-
ment conducted by an unlimited number of partners and clerks.
The principle upon which privileged communications rest, which,
of themselves, would otherwise be libellous, imports confidence and
secrecy between individuals, and is inconsistent with the idea of a
communication made by a society or congregation of persons only,
or by a private company or a corporate body."
This case was afterwards reversed by the Supreme Court, upon
another point, the question of privilege not being discussed: Tap-
pan v. Beardsley, 10 Wall. 427.
In Erber v. Dun, 12 Fed. Rcp. 526, the court expressly repu-
diate the principle of Beardsley v. Tappan, that only communica-
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tions made directly by the proprietors of the agency to their
subscribers are privileged. Judge CALDWELL, in his charge to the
jury, says: "The distinction attempted to be drawn between the
right to resort to the services of an agent in this business and other
legitimate business pursuits, is not well founded. It is not in har-
mony with the known and universal methods of conducting business.
* * * What a man may lawfully do by himself he may do by an
agent. The distinction taken between a communication to the
principal and his agent in the case of Beardsley v. Tappan, 5
Blatch. 497, is too refined. It is not supported by reason or
authority."
In Ormsby v. Douglass, 37 N. Y. 477 (1868), the Court of
Appeals held that a verbal report furnished by a mercantile agency
to a subscriber who is interested in the report, upon inquiry, is
privileged. The court say: "They (the slanderous words) were
communicated by the defendant, in the performance of a duty im-
posed upon him, to a person who had an interest in the matter and
who had a right to require the information. The communication
was in response to an inquiry as to the responsibility and standing
of the plaintiff, and embraced information relating to that subject.
* * * So long as the defendant acted in good faith in reporting
facts which came to his knowledge, which had any bearing upon
the subject of inquiry, even although the report may have contained
criminatory matter, which otherwise would have been slanderous
and actionable, he was justified and excusable." The court distin-
guish Taylor v. C1-urch on the ground that in fhat case the publi-
cation was made to persons having no interest in it. In accordance
with this decision are the cases of Truswell v. Scarlet, 18 Fed. R.
214, and Sate, &c., v. Eounsdale, 48 Wis. 348.
In Sunderlin v. Bradstreet, 46 N. Y. 188, the defendants,
proprietors of a mercantile agency, had published in their notifica-
tion sheet that the plaintiff had failed. The court held that the
publication was not privileged. It concedes, however, that reports
made to subscribers, who are interested only, and upon inquiry are
privileged. Judge ALLEN, who delivered the opinion of the court,
said: "In the case at bar, it is not pretended that but few, if any
of the persons to whom the ten thousand copies of the libellous
publication were transmitted, had any interest in the character or
pecuniary responsibility of the plaintiffs; and to those who had no
such interest, there was no just occasion or propriety in communi-
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eating the information. * * * The communication of the libel to
those not interested in the information, was officious and unauthor-
ized, and therefore not protected, although made in the belief of
its truth, if it were in point of fact false."
In the case of Erber v. Dun, 12 Fed. Rep. 526, it was held that
a special report was privileged, but that an item contained in the
notification sheet was not. As to the first, the court says "It is
indisputable, under the evidence, that whatever was said orally by
the defendants about the plaintiffs and their business, was ,said in
good faith and in confidence to their subscribers, who were, by rea-
son of their business relations with the plaintiff, interested in
knowing their financial and business standing, and in answer to
requests made by their subscribers in relation thereto, and without
malice in fact. This being so-and there is not the slightest evi-
dence to admit of a conclusion to the contrary-the statements thus
made by the defendants to their subscribers, in answer to inquiries
in relation to the plaintiff, are what the law terms ' privileged com-
munications.' "
As to the other point, the court says: "This daily notification
sheet was sent to all the subscribers to the agency at St. Louis,
without regard to the question whether they had any interest in the
defendants [plaintiffs ?] or their business. As a matter of fact, not
one per cent. of the subscribers to whom it was sent had such in-
terest. It is too clear for argument, that if this sheet contains a
libel on the plaintiff, the defendants cannot avail themselves of the
plea that it was a privileged communication."
In Locke v. Bradstreet Co., 22 Fed. R. 771, it was held that
special reports volunteered by the agency to subscribers, who had
an interest in such reports, and where there was a just occasion for
furnishing them, were privileged, although not applied for by the
subscribers to whom they were furnished.
In the very recent case of King v. Paterson, 11 East. Rep. 825,
it was held, on the authority of the cases above cited, an item ap-
pearing upon Dun's notification sheet to the effect that the plain-
tiff had given a chattel mortgage for $1385, was not a privileged
communication. The court was, however, not unanimous, five
judges out of a court of fourteen dissenting from the opinions of
the court upon this point. The dissenting opinion, which was de-
livered by Judge VAN SYCKEL, was very able.
The above cases are all the American cases which the writer has
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been able to find, which relate to the privilege of communications
or publications made by commercial agencies for the benefit of their
subscribers. They establish conclusively that special reports made
by the agency to its subscribers, upon application, are privileged
publications, and that such special reports are still privileged, al-
though conveyed from the agency to the subscribers through the
medium of clerks.
Upon the question of the privileged character of the published
sheet, the decisions and dicta have heretofore been unfavorable to
the agencies. In Taylor v. Church, and Sunderlin v. Bradstreet,
the courts squarely held that reports appearing upon the sheet were
not privileged, and those decisions were followed in .rber v. Dun.
The strong dissent, however, in the recent case of King v. Pater-
son, 11 East. 325, voiced by the able opinion of VAN SYCOEL, J.,
would seem to indicate that the law is not to be regarded as settled
definitively-that no manner or form of information or report fur-
nished by a commercial agency to its subscribers by means of the
"notification sheet," can fall within the category of privileged pub-
lications.
A comparison of the cases of Taylor v. Church and King v. Pat-
terson disclosed an important difference in the reports in question
in the two cases. In the former case the report, as printed upon
the sheet, was as follows: "Taylor, Hale & Murdock: Columbus,
Minn.-This concern does not seem to thrive here. M. is capable
in some respects, but is not a successful manager. * * * H. is
rather a negative character. Taylor resides in New York and
sends out undesirable, ill-assorted odds and ends, and unsaleable
stock. He was formerly with Ben. King. and I am told is an
unprincipled character." In King v. Paterson, the report was :
"New Jersey, Red Bank. Patterson, Erwina, Chattel Mortgage
Samuel Ludlow, $1385; clothing." The report in Taylor v.
Church was a detailed report of information collected from private
sources, while in King v. Paterson, the report apparently pur-
ported to be an abstract of an entry appearing upon a public
record.
This difference in the nature of the reports is an important one.
There would certainly seem to be some reason for holding a report
of matters of record a privileged publication, than for holding a
printed report of information gathered from private sources a privi-
leged publication. Indeed, it seems to have been settled in England
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that the publication in a sheet or periodical of a mercantile agency
or society of a report of a judgment against a merchant or trader,
taken from the record, is privileged. In _leming v. .Newton, 1 H.
of L. 0. 363, the applicants were the directors of the Scottish Mer-
cantile Society, which was a society of merchants and traders formed
for the purpose of collecting, for the exclusive use of members, in-
formation relating to the mercantile credit of the trading commu-
nity. In furtherance of the objects of the society, its directors
published, at regular intervals, and furnished to its members, for
their exclusive use, a book containing abstracts of all entries upon
the public records affecting the credit of business men.
Among the public records was a record of protests of bills and
notes, entry upon which, under the laws of Scotland, had the same
force and effect as an entry of judgment upon the bill or note, under
a warrant of attorney, would have under our law. Two notes
signed by the plaintiff were protested, and the protests entered upon
the record. The society had taken notes of these entries and pro-
posed to publish them in its book. This the plaintiff sought to have
them enjoined from doing. The court refused to grant the injunction
upon the ground that, the records being public, the defendants had
a right to print abstracts of entries appearing upon them. Lord
Chancellor COTTENHAM, who delivered the opinion of the House of
Lords in the case, said: " From these references it appears to me
clear that the legislature has thought that the public at large ought
to be able to have recourse to this register, and of all the public the
appellants have the highest interests in the knowledge of its con-
tents. They are engaged in mercantile affairs, in which their
security and success must greatly depend upon a knowledge of the
pecuniary transactions and credit of others. That each of them
might go or send to the office and search the register is not disputed,
and that they might communicate to each other what they had
found there is equally certain. What they have done is only doing
this by a common agent, and giving the information by means of
printing. No doubt if the matter be a libel, this is a publication
of it, but the transaction disproves any malice, and shows a legiti-
mate object for the act done."
In AHfallly v. Oldham, 16 Ir. Rep., 0. L. 298, the defendant had
published in a periodical, commonly known as " The Black List,"
as a subsisting liability, a judgment against the plaintiff, which had
been entered of record a week before the date of the publication,
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and which had actually been paid after it was so entered, although
no satisfaction of it appeared of record. The plaintiff sued in libel.
The defendant set up that the publication was an abstract report
of a judgment duly entered upon the record of the court and not
satisfied of record at the time of publication. It was claimed that
the publication was privileged, as being an abstract of an entry ap-
pearing upon a public record, and also on the ground that it was a
report of a judicial proceeding. The court conceded, on the
authority of Flening v. Newton, that the publications of judg-
ments appearing of record were privileged, but held that the fact
that the defendant published the judgment in question as an exist-
ing liability against the plaintiff at the time of publication, when it
had in fact been paid, destroyed the privilege. The decision of the
court appears to be scarcely in accordance with their concessions
of the privilege of published reports of judgments.
If such reports are privileged, then it seems to follow that they
are not actionable, although untrue and libellous, provided they are
accurate abstracts of the record, and provided also they were made
with proper care and in good faith. The publication in the case
under discussion was certainly an accurate abstract of the record,
and it was certainly made in good faith, although the imputation
contained in it, that the judgment was an existing liability, was
undoubtedly untrue and libellous. Was the defendant guilty of any
negligence in publishing the judgment as an existing liability,
which should have deprived the publication of its privileged char-
acter ? Not unless we can say that the fact that the judgment was
entered of record a week before the date of the publication, imposed
upon the defendant the duty of ascertaining whether the judgment
had not in fact been paid, although no satisfaction of it appeared
of record.
In Cosgrave v. Trade Auxiliary Co., Ir. Rep., 8 0. L. 849, it
was squarely held that a copy of a judgment printed in Stubbs'
Weekly Gazette, issued in connection with Stubbs' mercantile
office, was a privileged publication. In that case the plaintiff had
paid the judgment on the day it was entered, and had apprised the
defendants of the fact, and requested.them not to publish it in the
gazette. The defendants published the judgment, but added an
asterisk referring to a foot-note in these words: "We are requested
to state that the judgment has been paid." The court held, on the
authority of Fleming v. .orton, that the publication was privileged
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and not actionable. They distinguished the case from Mel'ally v.
Oldham, on the ground of the addition of the fact of payment to
the publication of the judgment. The case professes to distinguish
Me'ally v. Oldham in its facts, but it certainly seems to shake the
authority of the latter case, in so far as that case upholds the pro-
position that a publication of a correct copy of a judgment is not
privileged, although made in good faith, where extrinsic facts not
appearing of record, render the publication false and misleading.
These cases certainly seem to establish that abstracts of judgments
published in the sheets of a commercial agency are privileged.
In King v. Patterson, the abstract was of the record of a chattel
mortgage. Is there any distinction to be suggested between an
abstract of a judgment appearing upon the records of a court and
an abstract of the entry of a chattel mortgage upon a public record
of conveyances ? It may be urged that a judgment, being a pro-
ceeding in a court of justice, a report of it is privileged upon the
well-established rule that reports of judicial proceedings are privi-
leged publications. But it seems that this rule only applies to pro-
ceedings which take place in open court, and would not apply to
the mere formal entry of a judgment upon the records of a court.
The reason upon which rule rests is, that it is deemed conducive
to the prompt and efficient administration of justice that all pro-
ceedings in a court of justice should be made as public as possible,
and hence reports of such proceedings are held privileged, as tend-
ing to increase their publicity: Cowley v. Pulsifer, 187 Mass. 392,
396 ; Lewis v. Levy, El., Bl. & El. 537 ; Wason v. Walter, L. R.,
4 Q. B. 73; Bex v. Wright, 8 T. B. 298 ; Urill v. Hayes, 8 0.
P. D. 819. But this reason only applies to proceedings taking
place in open court, and it is accordingly held that a copy or ab-
stract of'a petition or bill in chancery, filed in court, is not a privi-
leged publication: Cowley v. Pulsifer, 187 Mass. 392. The reason
would seem equally inapplicable to a mere formal entering of a
judgment upon the court records. A judgment is published, not
as a judicial proceeding, but as a fact established as the result of
prior judicial proceedings-as a liability which is enforceable by
levy of execution, or which is a lien upon the property of the judg-
ment debtor.
Another distinction which might be suggested between a judg-
ment and a record of a mortgage, is that the record of mortgages,
although public, is not intended to give the public information as to
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the existence of any liability against the mortgagor, or of any other
fact affecting his credit, the object of the record being merely to
give notice to subsequent purchasers of a prior conveyance of the
property; whereas the record of judgment is, perhaps, in a measure
at least, intended to give the public notification of a liability estab-
lished against the judgment-debtor, otr the result of proceedings in
court. This distinction, if it exists, would seem to be too fine to
warrant a difference in holding, as to the matter of privilege, be-
tween a copy of a judgment and a copy of a record of a chattel
mortgage. It would seem that the cases of Fleming v. Newton,
MeNully v. Oldham, and Cosgrave v. Trade Auxiliary Company,
must be regarded as authorities for the proposition that abstracts
of entries upon all public records affecting the credit of traders or
business men, or houses, printed on sheets or in periodicals, by
commercial agencies, and distributed among their subscribers, are
privileged publications.
It is to be noted that, with the exception of King v. Patterson,
none of the American cases which have held reports appearing
upon notification sheets not to be privileged, have been cases where
the report was of a matter of record; and in King v. Patterson
the distinction between reports of matters of record and other
reports, was not noticed.
Examining the question upon principle, the arguments in favor
of holding notification sheets privileged communications, in so far
as they are made up of matters of record, seem to preponderate.
Whatever the original purpose of the records may have been, there
is not the least doubt but that records of judgments, mortgages,
conveyances and assignments are looked to by the business commu-
nity as sources of information as to facts affecting the financial
credit of business houses and business men. These facts being
already made public by appearing upon the public records, why not
give them the widest publicity among the part of the community
interested in them, by encouraging the publication of such facts in
papers circulating among that part of the community?
The argument against holding the publication of matters of record
in the notification sheet privileged, is the one urged in all the
cases which have held reports appearing in notification sheets, not
to be privileged, i. e., that the publication is made to persons having
no interest in the information. It is, of course, true that the noti-
fication sheets of the larger commercial agencies have a large circa-
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lation throughout the business community, while the part of the
business community interested in any particular matters of record
appearing upon the sheet, may be very small. Nevertheless, in
view of the extensive ramifications of business and the rapidity and
complexity of business transactions, it is impossible to say in any
given case how large a part of that community may be interested
in facts affecting the credit of a single business man or business
house. Is it, then, going too far to say that although the business
community is not interested, as a whole, in any single item of a mat-
ter of record in the notification sheet, it is, nevertheless, interested
as a whole in the entire body of information, as to matters of
record affecting the credit of business men, printed upon notifica-
tion sheets ?
So far, then, as they are made up of matters of record, it would
seem, both in principle and authority, that the notification sheets
of commercial agencies should be deemed privileged publica-
tions. The notification sheets of some of the larger commer-
cial agencies contain nothing else. Some agencies, however,
print also upon their sheets matters of notoriety which are not
of record: such as the death of a business man, or that he has been
burned out, or is selling out. Should such publications be deemed
privileged ? The question is a difficult one. In the case of Sun-
derlin v. Bradstreet, 46 N. Y. 188, it was squarely held that a
publication of the kind in question was not privileged. In that case
the agency printed upon its sheet that the plaintiff had failed, and
it was held that the publication was not privileged. This is the
only case the writer knows of that is squarely upon the point. Ex-
amining the question from the standpoint of principle, the reasons
for holding such publications privileged are much weaker than in
the case of publication of matters of record. When a man executes
a deed or a chattel mortgage he does so knowing that it will be en-
tered on the public record, and hence, in a measure, consents to the
fact being made public. And in the case of a judgment, if not
entered by consent, or under a power to confess judgment, it is only
established as the result of a trial in open court. On the other
hand, the notoriety of such facts as a man's failure, or his being
burned out, is involuntary on his part.
The argument in favor of holding reports in the notification
sheets of facts of general notoriety which are not matters of record
privileged publications, is the broad argument of public policy-
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that the needs of the business community demand the publication
of such reports in the sheet. Perhaps all that can be said of this
argument is that it will ultimately succeed or fail, according to the
need and demand for reports of the kind in question. If the
demand is so great that the agencies persist in printing them, not-
withstanding the hostile decision of the courts, the courts will, in
the end, come round and hold the reports privileged.
It may be well, in concluding, to point out that to hold the noti-
fication sheet a privileged publication, would not absolve the pub-
lisher from liability for the negligence of himself or his servants. It
is commonly said that where a libellous publication is privileged,
the malice implied in the publication of the libel is rebutted, and it
becomes necessary for the plaintiff, in order to recover, to prove
express or actual malice. It is clear, however, that actual malice,
as used in this connection, includes negligence, and that the privi-
leged character of the publication is destroyed, if the maker of it
was guilty of negligence, although he was not actuated by motives
of malice: Blake v. Stevens, 4 F. & F. 232. Admitting that
matters of record appearing upon the notification sheets are privi-
leged, the agencies publishing them would still be held to the
strictest accountability for any error or inaccuracy in the report
chargeable to it own negligence or that of its servants.
An interesting question that arises in this connection, is the duty
of commercial agencies to keep their notification sheets confidential
as far as possible. All commercial agencies print upon their sheets
"confidential" or "strictly confidential," and one of the express
terms of subscription to the agency is that the subscribers will not
show the notification sheet to any one else. How far would these
precautions be necessary in the case of a sheet containing matters
of record only, assuming that such a sheet would be a pri.vileged
publication ?
It is held that where a privileged publication is made to a larger
number of persons than is necessary or proper, this fact destroys
the privilege. Thus, it was held in Hatch v. Lane, 105 Mass. 894,
that the insertion in a newspaper of an advertisement by an em.
ployer, stating that he had discharged a salesman, and warning cus-
tomers not to pay their bills to such salesman, was privileged, but
that if the newspaper had. a more extensive circulation than the dis-
trict to which the defendant's business was confined, this would be
evidence for the jury of express malice to rebut the privileged
